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1 Introduction
A credence good is a commodity whose quality is difficult or impossible to as-
certain by consumers, even after experimentation. For example, in the case of
newspapers or magazines, readers may have difficulties in evaluating the accu-
racy with which the media outlets select and dispatch the news. Similarly, in
the case of restaurants, consumers have difficulties in evaluating the quality and
the freshness of the food, even after having experimented it.
Gabszewicz and Grilo (1992) and Bonroy and Constantatos (2008) have stud-
ied price competition between two firms selling vertically differentiated goods
when consumers cannot ascertain which firm sells which quality. Their analysis
is particularly suitable to understand price competition between credence goods.
In the present paper, we expand upon Gabszewicz and Grilo (1992) by incor-
porating horizontal differentiation along with vertical one in a duopoly pricing
model. We consider a model where goods are defined in a two characteristics
space and consumers do not know which firm sells which quality. Introducing
this specification leads to a model with two characteristics, the first one consist-
ing of the horizontal characteristic and the second of the beliefs of consumers
about firms´ product quality.
Several real life situations call for representing price competition within a
model in which products are differentiated along several characteristics. Think
of media outlets’ competition. Daily newspapers or weekly magazines attract
readers not only by the specificity of their content, would it be entertainment,
culture, information or a mix of them, but also by the accurateness of the in-
formation content. Similarly, when consumers are planning to dine out and
compare the merits of two restaurants, they consider the quality of the food,
but also their location and their respective ambiance and surroundings. These
examples illustrate the fact that consumers’ preferences often reflect the inter-
play between horizontal and vertical aspects. Henceforth, preferences are gen-
erally not one-dimensional and utility comparisons must deal with more than
one characteristic. While in the traditional literature, competition with differ-
entiated products is basically analyzed using alternatively the two models of
horizontal and vertical differentiation, some other contributions like Neven and
Thisse (1990), Irmen and Thisse (1998), Levin, Peck and Ye (2009), Daughety
and Reinganum, (2007) and (2008), or Gabszewicz and Wauthy (2011) have
presented models that simultaneously embrace horizontal and vertical differen-
tiation.
But often, even moving to models embedding multidimensional characteris-
tics, as in Neven and Thisse (1990), is not sufficient enough to capture various
significant real life ingredients of product differentiation. Among these, one of
the most important is consumers’ uncertainty about quality. Indeed, in sev-
eral economic contexts, consumers are unable to assert unequivocally either the
qualities of the variants offered in the market, or the firms who sell the fake
or the high quality brand. For example, we often observe that when choosing
between two media outlets, consumers highly value the rigor of the content pro-
vided by each media outlet, but they do not know with certainty which media
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outlet provides the most accurate content. Similarly, when consumers compare
the merits of different restaurants, they ignore, or do not know with certainty,
which restaurant uses the fresher ingredients. In fact, when analyzing market
competition, imperfect information of consumers about product characteristics,
and product quality in particular, is a recurrent problem.1
To the best of our knowledge, only a few papers have presented models
simultaneously embracing horizontal and vertical differentiation with private
information about firms’ quality. Levin, Peck and Ye (2009) investigate how
information disclosure can be used by firms to manipulate consumers’ beliefs
within a model in which consumers observe firms’ location (which is the source
of horizontal differentiation) while being uninformed about product’s quality.
Daughety and Reinganum (2007) and (2008) also present models in which goods
are both horizontally and vertically differentiated and firms have private infor-
mation about the quality of their products. These models investigate price
competition when prices can signal the quality of the goods.
The present paper contributes to the recent literature involving simulta-
neously horizontal and vertical differentiation with private information about
firms’ quality by providing a different approach to uncertainty about product
quality. While there are indeed many cases in which the observable choices made
by firms are able to provide consumers with a signal about products’ quality (in
line with the papers mentioned before), there are other situations in which it is
hard to use signalling devices to alleviate informational problems.
A particularly relevant type of goods corresponding to the last case are the
credence goods, in which consumers cannot ascertain the quality of the good
through experimentation. As pointed out by Bonroy and Constantatos (2008),
with credence goods, the production of a bad quality cannot be detected and
punished and therefore signalling becomes very hard since the delayed detection
of the low quality good allows its producer to mimic the strategy of the good
quality firm.2 Accordingly, in the case of credence goods, consumers can only
choose between the available goods on the basis of subjective beliefs about
the quality of each product. Going back to the examples above, we confirm
that both media outlets and restaurants may be viewed as credence goods. In
the case of media outlets, we observe that consumers may be willing to pay a
premium for more accurate news but they may have difficulties in distinguishing
which journal has more accurate news. Similarly, in the case of restaurants,
consumers may be willing to pay a premium for the use of healthier ingredients
(e.g. biological products versus genetically modified products). However, even
after repeated experimentation, it remains very difficult to ascertain the quality
of the ingredients used in the food served in each restaurant.
1There exists a huge literature devoted to market behavior under uncertainty (see, e.g.,
Shapiro (1983), Wolinsky (1986), Ungern-Sternberg and Weizacker (1985), Salop and Stiglitz
(1977), Stahl (1982)).
2The existence of credence goods leads their sellers to give advice to consumers about
the relative quality of the goods, which gives rise to a situation of asymmetric information.
This information asymmetry creates obvious incentives for an opportunistic behavior by the
sellers. Wolinsky (1995) studies how these phenomena affect the functioning of credence goods
markets.
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In light of these examples, the present paper proposes a model combining
horizontal and vertical differentiation when consumers do not know which firm
sells which quality, and firms are not able to rely on signalling devices to dis-
close the true quality of their goods. Our model is based on a synthesis of two
papers. The first is by Neven and Thisse (1990) and the second by Gabszewicz
and Grilo (1992). From the first, we borrow the idea of constructing a model
which accounts for two-dimensional competition, one related to a horizontally
differentiated characteristic of the good, and the other to a vertically differenti-
ated component. From the second one, we borrow the idea of relating vertical
product differentiation to uncertainty about the quality of the goods when firms
cannot manipulate consumers’ beliefs through signalling devices (e.g. credence
goods). Following their approach, we assume that consumers do not know
which firm sells which quality, holding heterogeneous beliefs about this event.
Consumers’ beliefs tend to be based on all the information made available to
them, like, for example, press reports, word-of-mouth, and so on. In light of
this fact, consumers’ beliefs are often heterogeneous since consumers’ ability to
search, absorb or process the available information may obviously differ among
consumers3.
In the context of our game of static price competition between firms selling
horizontally and vertically differentiated products (whose quality is uncertain),
we characterize the interior equilibria in prices, providing sufficient conditions
for its existence and uniqueness. We show that the characteristics of the equi-
librium are different depending on whether the dispersion of beliefs is more
significant than the dispersion of tastes, or vice-versa.
In addition, we provide an application of the model to the newspaper indus-
try, in which readers’ preferences over media outlets depend (i) on the political
viewpoints of the newspaper, that represent a horizontal differentiation dimen-
sion, as well as on (ii) the accuracy with which news are selected and dispatched
by the newspapers, which introduces a vertical differentiation element in read-
ers’ preferences. As the newspapers’ degree of accuracy is hard to ascertain
even after reading the news, in the same spirit of the abstract model, we con-
sider that readers are uncertain about which newspaper is the most credible
one. In the context of this application, we show that equilibrium prices depend
on whether the dispersion in political opinions is more significant (or not) than
the dispersion of beliefs regarding the newspapers’ credibility. In equilibrium,
the prices of the newspapers balance the popularity of the newspapers’ polit-
ical ideology and the credibility of their information. The weight assigned to
each of these elements depends on the relative dispersion of political opinions
vis-a`-vis the dispersion of beliefs regarding the accuracy of the news in each
newspaper. Relying on a numerical example, we illustrate how an exogenous
shock in the newspapers’ credibility may affect in different ways the nature of
price competition between the newspapers.
3Population’s beliefs about which firm sells which quality can make some consumers to view
one of the firms, say firm 1, as being more than likely the seller of the high quality variant,
while other consumers may well believe the reverse, inverting thereby their preferences for
firm 1 at the advantage of firm 2.
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section
3 provides the corresponding price equilibrium analysis. Section 4 develops
an application of the model to investigate price competition in the newspaper
industry. Finally, section 5 concludes.
2 The model
We consider two profit maximizing firms (firm 1 and firm 2) that produce two
goods (good 1 and good 2), differentiated along two characteristics. Goods are
produced at a constant marginal cost assumed to be equal to zero, without loss
of generality. With respect to the first characteristic, products 1 and 2 differ
by their quality. However, as in Gabszewicz and Grilo (1992), consumers are
uncertain about which firm sells which quality and, furthermore, consumers
differ in their beliefs about this uncertain event. The goods are supposed to
be differentiated horizontally with respect to the second characteristic which is
perfectly observable. Thereby, our model accounts for two distinct sources of
heterogeneity among consumers: (i) consumers formulate different subjective
probabilities (beliefs) concerning which good has a higher-quality in terms of
the unobservable characteristic; and (ii) they differ on their evaluation of goods’
merit in relation to the observable characteristic.
Each consumer is identified by a vector (m, θ) . The first component (m)
represents the subjective probability that consumer of type m assigns to the
event: {product 1 corresponds to the high-quality product}. We assume that m
is uniformly distributed in the interval [m,m], with
0 ≤ m < 1
2
< m ≤ 1.
We call the interval [m,m] the domain of beliefs. The second component (θ)
deals with the heterogeneity of consumers with respect to the horizontal differ-
entiation characteristic, measuring the differential in utilities consumer θ gets
when he/she consumes good 1 versus good 2. We assume that θ is uniformly
distributed in [θmin, θmax], with θmin < 0, representing the consumer who, con-
cerning this characteristic, prefers the most good 2 to good 1; and θmax > 0,
representing the consumer who prefers the least good 2 to good 1 regarding this
same characteristic.
The set of consumers (m, θ) is represented in the rectangle [m,m]×[θmin, θmax] .
When consumer (m, θ) buys good 1, at price p1, she/he expects to obtain a (ex-
pected) utility EU1 (m, θ, p1) defined by
EU1 (m, θ, p1) = V +m (uh) + (1−m) (ul) +
θ
2
− p1, (1)
where V denotes a positive constant4, and uh (resp. ul) is the utility provided
by the variant which corresponds to the high-quality (resp. low-quality) product
4The constant V is considered to be large enough for all consumers to find a product for
which their utilities are positive at equilibrium (covered market).
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with respect to the unobservable characteristic,with uh > ul ≥ 0. When con-
sumer (θ,m) buys good 2 (instead of good 1), she/he expects to get a (expected)
utility EU2 (m, θ, p2) defined by
EU2 (m, θ, p2) = V +m (ul) + (1−m) (uh)−
θ
2
− p2. (2)
Comparing (1) and (2) , it becomes clear that the parameter θ indeed repre-
sents the differential in utilities (with respect to the horizontal differentiation
component) consumer θ gets when she/he consumes good 1 versus good 2. For
example, everything else the same, consumer of type θmax obtains an increase
in utility of θmax2 when consuming good 1, and a decrease in utility of
θmax
2
when consuming good 2. On the contrary, consumer of type θmin gets a utility
reduction of θmin2 when consuming good 1 and a utility increase of
θmin
2 when
consuming good 2.
Conditional on prices (p1, p2) and for a given belief m ∈ [m,m] ,the consumer(
θ˜ (m) ,m
)
satisfying the equality
EU1
(
m, θ˜, p1
)
= EU2
(
m, θ˜, p2
)
⇔ (3)
⇔ θ˜ (m) = p1 − p2 + (1− 2m) (uh − ul) (4)
is indifferent between buying good 1 or good 2.
From expression (4) it follows that, for a given vector of prices (p1,p2) , the
marginal consumer θ˜(m) evolves linearly and negatively with m :
∂θ˜
∂m
= −2 (∆u) < 0,
with ∆u = uh − ul. Not surprisingly, for those types of consumers that assign
a greater probability m to the event {product 1 corresponds to the high-quality
product}, the critical value of θ˜(m) is lower. Thus, the higher the m−value, the
greater the mass of consumers θ who are willing to buy good 1 instead of good
2.
The following figures represent the set of consumers (m, θ) in the rectangle
[m,m]× [θmin, θmax] and the corresponding linear function θ˜ (m) in two different
cases, according to the values of the parameters.5
In both cases, the consumers lying on the line θ˜ (m) are indifferent between
buying the two goods, when m varies over [m,m] . Those above the line θ˜ (m)
5Notice that Figure 1 and Figure 2 do not cover all the possible demand configurations
corresponding to our problem. The full analysis of demand is quite tedious and we send it to
Appendix A.
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buy good 1, while those below buy good 2. Notice that, in figure 1, the dispersion
of tastes over the horizontal characteristic is more significant than the dispersion
of beliefs regarding which of the two goods is of higher quality. On the contrary,
on figure 2, the reverse holds and the dispersion of beliefs is more significant
than the dispersion of consumers’ tastes over the horizontal characteristic of the
good. Accordingly, the demand functions for the two goods depend on whether
tastes dispersion dominates the dispersion of beliefs, or vice-versa6. It is easy
to show that the first situation holds if and only if, the inequality
2∆u <
θmax − θmin
m−m (5)
is satisfied. The proof behind condition (5) is left to Appendix B.
It is easily seen that, in both cases, demands are continuous and decreasing in
firms’ own prices. However, there are domains of parameters in which demands
6A similar situation arises in the paper by Neven and Thisse (1992), in which the con-
figurations of demand depend on the relative weight consumers put on the horizontal versus
the vertical dimension of their preferences. They introduce the terminology of horizontal and
vertical dominance to identify the two resulting configurations of demand.
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are not everywhere concave functions7. Nevertheless, sufficient conditions can
be defined to guarantee that, in these domains, individual profits are decreas-
ing in firms’ own prices, for a given rival’s price. These conditions are thus
sufficient to prevent the occurrence of unilateral advantageous deviations which
could lead a pair of prices to fall in the above mentioned domains. Lemma 1
and Lemma 2 in Appendix respectively present these sufficient conditions when
2∆u < θmax−θminm−m , or vice-versa.
In the following section we characterize equilibrium prices. Firstly, in sub-
section 3.1 we analyze equilibrium prices when the dispersion of tastes is more
significant than the dispersion of beliefs. Then, in subsection 3.2, we investigate
the opposite case.
3 Equilibrium analysis
In this section, we characterize the Nash equilibrium arising in a static game, in
which (i) firms set their prices simultaneously and non-cooperatively; (ii) firms
have complete information, whereas consumers are uncertain about product
quality; and (iii) consumers’ preferences correspond to the ones described in
the previous section. As the demand functions for the two goods depend on
whether tastes dispersion dominates the dispersion of beliefs, or vice-versa, the
equilibrium analysis has to be performed separately for the two cases. When
2∆u < θmax−θminm−m and the conditions in lemma 1 hold
8, firms’ profits are quasi-
concave functions of prices and they reach only one maximum value in the
region9 where the profit functions write as
piH1 (p1, p2) =
(
θmax − p1 + p2 + (m+m− 1) ∆u
θmax − θmin
)
p1,
for firm 1, and
piH2 (p1, p2) =
(
1− θmax − p1 + p2 + (m+m− 1) ∆u
θmax − θmin
)
p2,
for firm 2.
Proposition 1 When 2∆u < θmax−θminm−m and the conditions in lemma 1 hold,
there exists a unique price equilibrium, given by:
pH∗1 =
1
3
(
(θmax − θmin) + θmax + 2
(
m+m
2 − 12
)
∆u
)
,
pH∗2 =
1
3
(
(θmax − θmin)− θmin − 2
(
m+m
2 − 12
)
∆u
)
,
(6)
with pH∗1 > 0 and p
H∗
2 > 0.
7It can be seen that the demand of firm 1 is convex in (p1, p2) ∈ Rj2, j = H,V where the
expression of Rj2, j = H,V is defined as in Appendix A. Analogously, demand of firm 2 is
convex in (p1, p2) ∈ Rj4, j = H,V where again Rj4, j = H,V is defined as in Appendix A. In
the remaing regions, the demand functions can be easily shown to be concave.
8See the Proof of Lemma 1 in Appendix B.
9For more details see appendix A, where this region is referred as RH3 .
7
Proof. See Appendix B.
Now, when 2∆u > θmax−θminm−m and the conditions in lemma 2 hold
10, firms’
profits are quasi-concave functions of prices and they reach only one maximum
value in the region11 where the profit functions write as
piV1 (p1, p2) =
(
1
4
θmax + θmin − 2p1 + 2p2 − 2 (1− 2m) ∆u
∆u (m−m)
)
p1,
for firm 1, and
piV2 (p1, p2) =
(
1− 1
4
θmax + θmin − 2p1 + 2p2 − 2 (1− 2m) ∆u
∆u (m−m)
)
p2,
for firm 2.
Proposition 2 When 2∆u > θmax−θminm−m and the conditions in lemma 2 hold,
there exists a unique price equilibrium, given by:
pV ∗1 =
1
3
(
(2 (m+ (m−m))− 1) ∆u+ θmax+θmin2
)
,
pV ∗2 =
1
3
(
(2 ((m−m)−m) + 1) ∆u− θmax+θmin2
)
,
(7)
with pV ∗1 > 0 and p
V ∗
2 > 0.
Proof. See the Appendix B.
From Proposition 1 and 2, it follows that under perfect symmetry of tastes
(i.e. θmax = −θmin) and beliefs (i.e. m+m2 = 12 ), the two equilibrium prices
are equal. By contrast, it is the asymmetry in tastes and/or in beliefs which
generates a price differential between the two goods. For instance, if θmax =
−θmin and good 1 is more trustworthy than good 2, we get 2∆u > θmax−θminm−m
and pV ∗1 > p
V ∗
2 , reflecting this advantage of good 1 over good 2.
Comparing our results with Gabszewicz and Grilo (1992), we observe that
the equilibrium prices in the latter coincide with ours when we ”neutralize”
the heterogeneity of consumers’ tastes with respect to the horizontal charac-
teristic, i.e. θmax = −θmin = 0. In that case, the inequality 2∆u > θmax−θminm−m
necessarily holds. When θmax > −θmin (resp. θmax < −θmin), the equilibrium
price of firm 1 (resp. firm 2) exceeds the corresponding equilibrium price of
this firm in Gabszewicz and Grilo (1992) , while the other firm charges a lower
price in our setting. In the case 2∆u < θmax−θminm−m , ”neutralizing” the hetero-
geneity of consumers’ preferences with respect to the horizontal characteristic
(θmax = −θmin = 0) necessarily requires ∆u to be equal to zero12. In that case,
both firms quote prices equal to zero at equilibrium: since there is no more any
source of differentiation between goods, we end up with pure competition ”a` la
Bertrand”.
10See the Proof of Lemma 2 in Appendix B.
11For more details see appendix A, where this region is referred as RV3 .
12This corresponds to a degenerate case of lemma 1 in the Appendix. When θmax =
−θmin = 0, given that m < 12 < m, the conditions in lemma 1 are only valid for ∆u = 0.
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Now assume that quality is perfectly observable and, without loss of gener-
ality, good 1 is the high-quality good. Then m = m = 1 and the only source of
heterogeneity among consumers comes from the horizontal differentiation com-
ponent (θ).
Then, the demand for good 1 obtains as:
D1 (p1, p2) =

0 if p1 − p2 > θmax + ∆u
θmax−(p1−p2−∆u)
θmax−θmin if θmin + ∆u < p1 − p2 < θmax + ∆u
1 if p1 − p2 < θmin + ∆u
(8)
and
D2 (p1, p2) = 1−D1 (p1, p2) . (9)
It is easily seen that firms’ demands are continuous, decreasing and concave
functions of firms’ own prices. Firms’ best-reply functions are then given by13:
p1 (p2) =
{
1
2 (θmax + p2 + ∆u) if 0 < p2 < (θmax − 2θmin −∆u)
p2 + θmin + ∆u if p2 > (θmax − 2θmin −∆u) ,
in the case of firm 1, and
p2 (p1) =
 p1 − θmax −∆u if p1 > 2θmax − θmin + ∆u− 12 (θmin − p1 + ∆u) if θmin + ∆u < p1 < 2θmax − θmin + ∆u
p1 − θmin −∆u if p1 < θmin + ∆u
,
in the case of firm 2.
Thus, in a scenario of perfect information, equilibrium prices with both firms
active in the market obtain as:
pPI∗1 =
1
3 (2θmax − θmin + ∆u) ,
pPI∗2 =
1
3 (θmax − 2θmin −∆u) ,
which occurs as long as:
θmax − 2θmin > ∆u.
Proposition 3 Under perfect information, when the conditions of lemma 1
hold, both firms are active at equilibrium. Furthermore, equilibrium prices co-
incide with those obtained for imperfect information when the domain of beliefs
is degenerate and reduces to the singleton m = 1.
Accordingly, the introduction of a ”perfect label”, that would perfectly dis-
close which firm sells which quality, leads to an increase in the price of the high
quality good and a concomitant decrease in the price of the low-quality one.14
13We do not consider price policies leading to the eviction of firm 2, since these would
require p2 < −θ1 −∆u, which is inconsistent with the non-negativity constraint.
14See Bonroy and Constantatos (2008) on the effects of perfect labels on equilibrium.
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Proposition 4 Under perfect information, when the conditions of lemma 2
hold, both firms are active at equilibrium if and only if:
θmax − 2θmin > ∆u.
Otherwise only the firm selling the high-quality good is active in the market.
Indeed, in the case 2∆u > θmax−θminm−m
15 as stated in lemma 2, an interior
solution can only arise if consumers’ preferences with respect to the horizontal
characteristic are biased towards good 2, i.e. θmax − 2θmin > ∆u. If this
condition is not satisfied, the equilibrium price of good 2 would be negative.
Therefore, there is only space for the high-quality good in this industry. At
equilibrium, the monopolist (firm 1) would charge a price p∗PI1 equal to
p∗PI1 = θmin + ∆u,
which prevents entry of firm 2 even when p∗PI2 = 0 (limit price).
Accordingly, there are situations in which the low quality firm can survive
only due to consumers’ imperfect information. Informing consumers would lead
to the exclusion of the low quality firm, thus entailing a more concentrated
equilibrium market structure.16 In spite of this, it can be shown that the loss
of profits by the low quality firm is more than compensated by the welfare
improvement for the other agents.
Another benchmark to compare our solutions would consist in comparing
the equilibria obtained in our analysis with the one corresponding to a fully
deterministic vertical differentiation model with variants’ qualities defined by
u1 =
m+m
2
uh +
(
1− m+m
2
)
ul
u2 =
m+m
2
ul +
(
1− m+m
2
)
uh.
This corresponds to replace the uncertainty bearing on the identity of the
firms by the certainty equivalent obtained by the average consumer, say con-
sumer mˆ, whose beliefs coincide with the average belief17 mˆ = m+m2 .
Notice that, by focusing on consumer mˆ, we neutralize consumers’ dispersion
of beliefs since all consumers are now assumed to have the same beliefs as
consumer mˆ. Consequently, as in the case of perfect information, we end up with
a pure horizontal differentiation model, with consumers’ heterogeneity bearing
exclusively on the interval [θmin, θmax] . In this case, when both firms are active
at equilibrium, prices are equal to:
pH∗1 =
1
3 (2θmax − θmin + (2mˆ− 1) ∆u) ,
pH∗2 =
1
3 (θmax − 2θmin − (2mˆ− 1) ∆u) ,
15In the case of perfect information (m= m = 1), the vertical dominance as stated in lemma
2 establishes that vertical differentiation must be sufficiently strong: ∆u > θmax−3θmin
2
.
16It is worth noting that the result in the previous Porposition is, in part driven, by the
assumption that the costs of production are the same for both firms.
17In particular, when mˆ = 1, the case of certainty equivalent coincides with the case of
perfect information when good 1 is the high-quality good.
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which coincide with the prices obtained when 2∆u < θmax−θminm−m ,with beliefs
uniformly distributed on the interval [m,m] (see (6)).
4 An application to the newspapers´ industry
In this section, we illustrate how the abstract analysis proposed above can be
applied to a specific industry. In order to keep in line with one of the ex-
amples given above, this section investigates competition in the newspapers’
industry. We consider two newspapers or weekly magazines representing the
ideas of two different political parties: one left wing newspaper (say newspa-
per 1) and one right wing newspaper (newspaper 2). The political spectrum
of the readers is represented by the interval [θmin, θmax] , in which readers are
uniformly distributed, each point in the interval representing simultaneously a
specific political opinion and the reader for whom this opinion is its ”ideal” one.
For instance, θmin < 0 corresponds to the reader who has the most extreme
left opinion and θmax > 0 the most extreme right one. The political opinion
dimension clearly corresponds to the horizontal component of readers’ prefer-
ences, given by (1) and (2). A reader of type θ ∈ [θmin, θmax] values the political
ideas expressed in newspaper 1 and dislikes the political views of newspaper 2
when θ > 0. The reverse situation happens if the readers’ ideal political opinion
satisfies θ < 0.
However, readers’ preferences over the two newspapers not only depend on
the political opinion they represent but also on the degree of accuracy with
which news are selected and dispatched by each of the newspapers. From that
viewpoint, all readers agree that the higher this accuracy, the better. This rep-
resents the vertical dimension of readers’ preferences in (1) and (2). To be more
precise, in the context of this application to the newspaper industry, uh denotes
utility impact of the most accurate newspaper, whereas ul corresponds to the
utility impact of the least accurate newspaper. We denote by ∆u, ∆u = uh−ul,
the resulting ”quality gap”. Of course, readers do not know with certainty which
newspaper has the higher accuracy. Furthermore, readers’ beliefs regarding the
newspapers’ credibility are heterogeneous. In the context of our model, the
trust of a particular reader in the accuracy of news in each newspaper is repre-
sented by the number m, which corresponds to the subjective probability that
the reader of type m assigns to the event
{newspaper 1 corresponds to the most credible newspaper} .
We assume that m is uniformly distributed in the ”domain of beliefs” [m,m]
, with 0 ≤ m < 12 < m ≤ 1.
As shown in Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 above, the prices quoted by
newspapers in equilibrium depend on the compliance (or not) of condition (5).
When the dispersion of political opinions is more significant than the disper-
sion of beliefs regarding the newspaper’s credibility, condition (5) holds. Thus,
under the conditions in Lemma 1, equilibrium prices in the newspaper market
are given by (6) and they depend on two factors: (i) the popularity of each
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newspaper’s political viewpoint within the universe of readers;18 and (ii) the
average beliefs about the credibility of each newspaper. When the dispersion
of political opinions is less significant than the dispersion of beliefs regarding
the newspaper’s credibility, condition (5) is violated. Under the conditions in
Lemma 2, the equilibrium prices are (7), which depend on two factors: (i) the
average political opinion among the universe of readers; and (ii) the readers’
beliefs about the credibility of each newspaper.19
In light of the previous results, we now study how a shock in readers’ beliefs
may affect the nature of price competition between firms. To this end, we
consider (i) a spectrum of political opinions given by [θmin, θmax] =
[− 14 , 34] ,
with the political viewpoint of newspaper 1 being more popular among the
population of readers; and (ii) a domain of beliefs equal to
[
1
4 ,
3
4
]
, which both
newspapers believed to be equally credible among the population of readers.
Then we assume, for example, that it is publicly revealed that newspaper 1 has
hidden important news, while newspaper 2 has made reference to them. As a
result, all readers are led to revise their beliefs about the trust they have in
each newspaper. Of course, while beliefs were symmetric before this exogenous
shock, now all readers become more suspicious about newspaper 1 so that the
domain of beliefs switches from
[
1
4 ,
3
4
]
to, say,
[
1
10 ,
6
10
]
.
Starting with a ”quality gap” ∆u equal to 0.2, we have that, before the shock
in the newspaper’s 1 credibility, condition (5) is satisfied and equilibrium prices
are given by pH∗1 = 0.58 and p
H∗
2 = 0.42, since both the conditions in Lemma 1
hold for the values of the parameters. After the shock, we have that, everything
else the same, the condition (5), as well as the conditions in Lemma 1 remain
valid, with equilibrium prices being now equal to p˜H∗1 = 0.56 and p˜
H∗
2 = 0.44.
As expected, we obtain that the equilibrium price of the newspaper which has
now become less credible decreases, whereas the price of the rival newspaper
increases. Yet, newspaper 1 remains more expensive since its political viewpoint
remains the most popular one.
However, the revelation of the behavior of a newspaper in hiding information
may affect preferences in more than one way. For example, the revelation of this
kind of behavior on the part of newspapers may cause a ”psychological shock”
among the readers’ population, so that readers now start to pay much more
attention to the accuracy of news. As a result, the impact of news’ accuracy
on readers’ preferences changes. For example, if the ”quality gap” between the
two newspapers expands from ∆u = 210 to ∆u = 2, condition (5) is no longer
satisfied. As a result, the equilibrium prices quoted by newspapers are no longer
given by (6). Instead, equilibrium prices are equal to (7) since the conditions
in Lemma 2 are satisfied for the selected values of the parameters. Accordingly,
at the new equilibrium after the shock, we have pV ∗1 = 0.97 and p
V ∗
2 = 1.03.
18The popularity of the newspapers’ political viewpoints depend on the support of the
distribution of θ, given by [θmin, θmax] . If θmax > −θmin, the political viewpoint of newspaper
1 is more popular among readers (which, everything else the same, makes newspaper 1 more
expensive than newspaper 2). On the contrary, if θmax < −θmin, the political viewpoint of
newspaper 2 is the dominant one among the universe of readers.
19These beliefs depend on the domain of beliefs [m,m]
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Comparing these prices with p˜H∗1 = 0.56 and p˜
H∗
2 = 0.44, we observe that the
expansion in the value of ∆u allows both newspapers to increase their prices
(including the now less credible newspaper). However, after the shock in ∆u,
the now more credible newspaper becomes more expensive. Despite being the
newspaper conveying the least popular political viewpoint, after the expansion
of ∆u, the dispersion of beliefs becomes more significant than the dispersion of
political opinions. This leads the more credible (yet less popular newspaper) to
charge a higher price than its rival.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have considered price competition when variants are defined
along two dimensions (horizontal and vertical) and consumers are uncertain
about which firm sells which quality. We focus on the case of credence goods, in
which the quality of the good can be hardly ascertained by simple experimen-
tation.
The paper identifies sufficient conditions for existence and uniqueness. These
conditions correspond in a wide domain of the parameters. Interestingly, this
domain comprises two distinct sub-domains, according as the quality gap be-
tween the goods is sufficiently small (resp. large) when compared to the ratio
between the dispersion of consumers’ tastes and the dispersion of consumers’
beliefs about quality. In each sub-domain we characterize the equilibrium prices
with respect to the main magnitudes of the model: (i) size of the quality gap,
(ii) dispersion of tastes; and (iii) dispersion of beliefs.
Then, we apply our model assuming perfect information, in which consumers
know which firm sells the high quality good. Perfect information, by eliminating
the dispersion of consumers’ beliefs engenders a pure horizontally differentiated
model. We conclude that, when the quality gap is sufficiently large and con-
sumers are perfectly informed about it, informing consumers could lead to the
exclusion of the low quality firm (while, it could survive in a setting of imperfect
information).
We have also considered the certainty equivalent outcome, in which the
dispersion of consumers’ beliefs is eliminated and replaced by the beliefs of the
average consumer. In this benchmark case, equilibrium prices coincide with
those obtained in a setting of imperfect information when the dispersion of
tastes is more significant than the dispersion of beliefs. Moreover, when the
average consumer is perfectly informed, the equilibrium prices corresponding
to the certainty equivalent outcome coincide with those obtained under perfect
information.
Finally, we have shown how to apply the model to the case of a specific indus-
try, the newspaper’s market. Newspapers are credence goods when horizontal
preferences for political opinions are combined with the degree of accuracy in
news provision attached by readers to each newspaper. The analysis allows us
to show how an external shock influencing both the domain of the beliefs of
readers and their relative valuation of the newspapers’ credibility affects the
13
equilibrium prices.
Applying the same abstract model to other industries in which credence
goods are produced and exchanged would be a fruitful field for future research.
We have already quoted the market for restaurants. It could also be applied to
the industry of the electromenager, when the washing machine may break down,
or to the industry of car repairs,when the car is about to die. More generally, it
could apply to all situations when commissioning an expert would be necessary
to ascertain the quality of a product, without even being sure that it would be
ascertained after the visit of the expert...
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Appendix
Appendix A: The demand functions
According to (4), at a given pair of prices (p1, p2), the set of consumers
can be partitioned into two subsets, each describing those consumers who buy
good 1 and good 2, respectively. For a given value of m ∈ [m,m] , the subset of
consumers buying good 1 is given by
[
θ˜(m), θmax
]
, while the subset of consumers
buying good 2 is given by
[
θmin, θ˜(m)
]
.
The following figures illustrate the structure of demands for different pairs of
prices (p1, p2) . The first figures represent the various configurations of demand
when 2∆u < θmax−θminm−m .
Each rectangle in the figure above identifies a specific partition of the set of
consumers corresponding to different pairs of prices (p1, p2). Case 1 corresponds
16
to a value of p1 which, given p2, is so high that there is no consumer willing to
buy variant 1 at that price. In cases 2, 3 and 4, both firms are active in the
market. In case 2, the demand of firm 1 corresponds to the area of the shadow
triangle. When p1 further decreases, we move to case 3, where all types m are
served by both firms and the demand of firm 1 now consists of an area which
is the sum of a triangle and a rectangle. When p1 even further decreases, we
move to case 4 and now demand corresponds to an area which is the sum of a
triangle and two rectangles. Finally, in case 5, firm 1 becomes a monopolist and
the demand of firm 2 is equal to zero.
When 2∆u > θmax−θminm−m , similar comments apply mutatis mutandis and the
structure of demand is represented in the following figure.
Addressing first the case when 2∆u < θmax−θminm−m , we define by R
H
i the set
RHi ={(p1, p2) : (p1, p2) leads to a demand corresponding to case i, i = 1, ..., 5}.
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In this setting, we obtain the analytical expressions of firms’ demands as:
DH1 (p1, p2) =

0 if (p1, p2) ∈ RH1
1
4
(θmax−p1+p2+(2m−1)∆u)2
(m−m)(θmax−θmin)∆u if (p1, p2) ∈ RH2
θmax−p1+p2+(m+m−1)∆u
θmax−θmin if (p1, p2) ∈ RH3
1− 14 (θmin−p1+p2−(1−2m)∆u)
2
(m−m)(θmax−θmin)∆u if (p1, p2) ∈ RH4
1 if (p1, p2) ∈ RH5 ,
and
DH2 (p1, p2) = 1−DH1 (p1, p2) ,
Observing figure 3, it becomes evident that RHI is observed whenever θ (m) >
θmax, or equivalently:
RH1 = {(p1, p2) : p1 − p2 > θmax + (2m− 1) ∆u} .
From figure 3, it follows as well that RH2 is observed whenever: θ (m) >
θmax and, simultaneously θmin < θ (m) < θmax. When 2∆u < θmax−θminm−m , these
conditions imply:
RH2 = {(p1, p2) : (2m− 1) ∆u+ θmax < p1 − p2 < θmax + (2m− 1) ∆u} .
Similarly, RH3 is observed when θ (m) > θmin and θ (m) < θmax, which, under
2∆u < θmax−θminm−m , are equivalent to:
RH3 = {(p1, p2) : θmin + (2m− 1) ∆u < p1 − p2 < θmax + (2m− 1) ∆u} .
RH4 is observed when θmin < θ (m) < θmax and, simultaneously, θ (m) <
θmin. This is equivalent to
RH4 = {(p1, p2) : θmin + (2m− 1) ∆u < p1 − p2 < θmin + (2m− 1) ∆u} .
Finally, underRH5 firm 1 is a monopolist, which is observed whenever θ (m) <
θmin, or equivalently:
RH5 = {(p1, p2) : p1 − p2 < θmin + (2m− 1) ∆u} .
When 2∆u < θmax−θminm−m , we define by R
V
i the set R
V
i ={(p1, p2) : (p1, p2)
leads to a demand corresponding to case i, i = 1, ..., 5}. In this setting, the
analytical expressions of firms’ demands are given by:
DV1 (p1, p2) =

0 if (p1, p2) ∈ RV1
1
4
(θmax−p1+p2+(2m−1)∆u)2
(m−m)(θmax−θmin)∆u if (p1, p2) ∈ RV2
1
4
θmax+θmin−2p1+2p2−2(1−2m)∆u
∆u(m−m) if (p1, p2) ∈ RV3
1− 14 (θmin−p1+p2−(1−2m)∆u)
2
(m−m)(θmax−θmin)∆u if (p1, p2) ∈ RV4
1 if (p1, p2) ∈ RV5 ,
18
and
DV2 (p1, p2) = 1−DV1 (p1, p2) ,
with each demand region being given by:
RV1 = {(p1, p2) : p1 − p2 > θmax + (2m− 1) ∆u} ,
RV2 = {(p1, p2) : θmin + (2m− 1) ∆u < p1 − p2 < θmax + (2m− 1) ∆u} ,
RV3 = {(p1, p2) : θmax + (2m− 1) ∆u < p1 − p2 < θmin + (2m− 1) ∆u} ,
RV4 = {(p1, p2) : θmin + (2m− 1) ∆u < p1 − p2 < θmax + (2m− 1) ∆u} ,
RV5 = {(p1, p2) : p1 − p2 < θmin + (2m− 1) ∆u} .
19
Appendix B - Proofs
Lemma 5 Sufficient conditions when 2∆u < θmax−θminm−m
The condition
θmax ≥ (1 +m− 3m) ∆u (10)
is sufficient to guarantee that profits of firm 1 are decreasing in p1 when (p1, p2) ∈
RH2 . Similarly profits of firm 2 are decreasing in p2 when (p1, p2) ∈ RH4 if
−θmin ≥ (3m−m− 1) ∆u (11)
Proof. In (p1, p2) ∈ RH2 , firm 1′s profits are given by a third-degree polynomial:
pi1 (p1, p2)eRH2 =
(
1
4
(θmax − p1 + p2 + (2m− 1) (∆u))2
(m−m) (θmax − θmin) (∆u)
)
p1,
with limp1→∞
((
1
4
(θmax−p1+p2+(2m−1)(∆u))2
(m−m)(θmax−θmin)(∆u)
)
p1
)
= +∞.
The extremes of pi1 (p1, p2)eRH2 are obtained as
∂
“
pi1(p1,p2)eRH2
”
∂p1
= 0, yielding:
pˆ1 (p2) = θmax + p2 + (2m− 1) (∆u) (12)
pˇ1 (p2) =
1
3
(θmax + p2 + (2m− 1) (∆u)) (13)
Notice that, for a given p2, the price level pˆ1 (p2) corresponds to the switching
price between RH2 and R
H
I (where firm 1 is evicted from the market, obtaining
nil profits). Accordingly, firm 1 will never have any incentives to make an
unilateral deviation towards pˆ1 (p2) .
Furthermore, it is easy to see that:
∂pi1 (p1, p2)eRH2
∂p1
e+pˇ1(p2) < 0 (14)
∂pi1 (p1, p2)eRH2
∂p1
e−pˇ1(p2) > 0. (15)
Accordingly, if pˇ1 (p2) occurs for (p1, p2) : pˇ1 (p2) − p2 < (2m− 1) (∆u) +
θmax, we observe that pˇ1 (p2) would be outside (at the left) of RH2 . Thus,
considering (12)-(15), for any (p1, p2) ∈ RH2 , we observe that
∂pi1(p1,p2)eRH2
∂p1
< 0,
preventing any incentives for advantageous unilateral deviations by firm 1. To
end the proof, plug (13) in the condition
pˇ1 (p2)− p2 < (2m− 1) (∆u) + θmax, (16)
obtaining:
p2 > − (θmax + (3m−m− 1) (∆u)) (17)
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Given that prices must be non-negative, a sufficient condition to guarantee
that (17) holds is:
− (θmax + (3m−m− 1) (∆u)) < 0⇔
⇔ θmax > (1 +m− 3m) (∆u) ,
which corresponds to condition (10) in Lemma 1.
Concerning the second condition in lemma 2, one must analyze profits of
firm 2 under the case of horizontal dominance. In (p1, p2) ∈ RH4 , firm 2′s profits
are given by a third-degree polynomial:
pi2 (p1, p2)eRH4 =
(
1
4
(θmin − p1 + p2 − (1− 2m) (∆u))2
(m−m) (θmax − θmin) (∆u)
)
p2,
with limp2→∞
((
1
4
(θmin−p1+p2−(1−2m)(∆u))2
(m−m)(θmax−θmin)(∆u)
)
p2
)
= +∞.
The extremes of pi2 (p1, p2)eRH4 are obtained as
∂
“
pi2(p1,p2)eRH4
”
∂p2
= 0, yielding:
pˆ2 (p1) = −θmin + p1 − (2m− 1) (∆u) (18)
pˇ2 (p1) =
1
3
(−θmin + p1 − (2m− 1) (∆u)) (19)
Notice that, for a given p1, the price level pˆ2 (p1) corresponds to the switching
price between RH4 and R
H
5 (where firm 2 is evicted from the market, obtaining
nil profits). Accordingly, firm 2 will never have incentives to make an unilateral
deviation towards pˆ2 (p1) .
Furthermore, it is easy to see that
∂pi2 (p1, p2)eRH4
∂p2
e−pˇ2(p1) > 0 (20)
∂pi2 (p1, p2)eRH4
∂p2
e+pˇ2(p1) < 0. (21)
Accordingly, if pˇ2 (p1) occurs for (p1, p2) : p1−pˇ2 (p1) > θmin+(2m− 1) (∆u) ,
we observe that pˇ2 (p1) would be outside (at the left) of RH4 . Thus, considering
(20)-(21), for any (p1, p2) ∈ RH4 , we observe that
∂pi2(p1,p2)eRH4
∂p2
< 0, prevent-
ing any incentives for advantageous unilateral deviations by firm 1. To end the
proof, plug (19) in the condition
p1 − pˇ2 (p1) > θmin + (2m− 1) (∆u) , (22)
obtaining
p1 > θmin − (m− 3m+ 1) (∆u) (23)
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Given that prices must be non-negative, a sufficient condition to guarantee
that the previous condition holds is:
θmin − (m− 3m+ 1) (∆u) < 0⇔
⇔ −θmin > (3m− 1−m) (∆u) ,
which corresponds to condition (11) in Lemma 1.
Lemma 6 Sufficient conditions when 2∆u > θmax−θminm−m
The condition
∆u >
θmax − 3θmin
2 (2m− 1) (24)
is sufficient to guarantee that profits of firm 1 are decreasing in p1 when (p1, p2) ∈
RV2 . Similarly profits of firm 2 are decreasing in p2 when (p1, p2) ∈ RV4 if
∆u >
3θmax − θmin
2 (1− 2m) .
Proof. Notice that all the comments concerning the profits of firm 1 up to ex-
pression (15) in the proof of lemma 1 also hold in the case of vertical dominance.
However, considering the price domains, in the case of vertical dominance, con-
dition (16) becomes
pˇ1 (p2)− p2 < θmin + (2m− 1) (∆u) ,
which is equivalent to:
p2 >
1
2
(θmax − 3θmin − 2 (2m− 1) (∆u)) .
Given non-negativity of prices a sufficient condition to guarantee that the
above inequality holds for all feasible p2 is:
1
2
(θmax − 3θmin − 2 (2m− 1) (∆u)) < 0⇔
⇔ ∆u > θmax − 3θmin
2 (2m− 1) ,
which corresponds to the first condition in lemma 2.
Similarly, all the comments concerning the profits of firm 2 until expression
(21) also hold in the case of vertical dominance. However, considering the price
domains, in the case of vertical dominance, condition (22) becomes
p1 − pˇ2 (p1) > θmax + (2m− 1) (∆u) ,
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which is equivalent to:
p1 >
1
2
(3θmax − θmin + 2 (2m− 1) (∆u)) .
Given non-negativity of prices a sufficient condition to guarantee that the
above inequality holds for all feasible p2 is:
1
2
(3θmax − θmin + 2 (2m− 1) (∆u)) < 0⇔
⇔ ∆u > 3θmax − θmin
2 (1− 2m) ,
which corresponds to the second condition in lemma 2.
Proof of Proposition 1
When the conditions in lemma 1 hold, firms’ profits are quasi-concave func-
tions of prices and they reach only one maximum value in the region RH3 where
the profit functions write as
piH1 (p1, p2) =
(
θmax − p1 + p2 + (m+m− 1) ∆u
θmax − θmin
)
p1,
for firm 1, and
piH2 (p1, p2) =
(
1− θmax − p1 + p2 + (m+m− 1) ∆u
θmax − θmin
)
p2,
for firm 2.
In light of the properties of the profit functions, the profit-maximizing prices
are obtained by the following system of equations:
∂piH1 (p1,p2)
∂p1 eRH3
= 0
∂piH2 (p1,p2)
∂p2 eRH3
= 0
,
leading to the equilibrium prices presented in Proposition 1. 
Proof of Proposition 2
When the conditions in lemma 2 hold, firms’ profits are quasi-concave func-
tions of prices and they reach only one maximum value in the region RV3 where
the profit functions write as
piV1 (p1, p2) =
(
1
4
θmax + θmin − 2p1 + 2p2 − 2 (1− 2m) ∆u
∆u (m−m)
)
p1,
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for firm 1, and
piV2 (p1, p2) =
(
1− 1
4
θmax + θmin − 2p1 + 2p2 − 2 (1− 2m) ∆u
∆u (m−m)
)
p2,
for firm 2.
In light of the properties of the profit functions, the profit-maximizing prices
are obtained by the following system of equations:
∂piV1 (p1,p2)
∂p1 eRV3
= 0
∂piV2 (p1,p2)
∂p2 eRV3
= 0
,
leading to the equilibrium prices presented in Proposition 2. 
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